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Scholars typically attribute the demise of empires in the wake of World War I to their struggle 
with emerging nation-states.1 Yet making the nation into the primary subject of analysis often 
obscures crucial differences within the new political entities. Of course, this is not to overlook the 
important scholarship that tackles local and regional issues either directly or as part of a larger 
narrative. This includes studies of transitional events in Upper Silesia; a collection of local stories 
from Austria-Hungary; new work on postwar violence throughout East-Central Europe; and even 
more targeted studies of such ethnic groups as the Mazurians and the Budweisers.2 All these 
works depict important episodes in the broader history of the crystallization of sometimes rather 
heterogeneous nations around their new nation-states.3 
However, what is generally lacking in the historiographical literature are comprehensive 
comparative studies of local level transitions. We know surprisingly little, for example, about 
how the various revolutions assumed administrative and political power in individual localities; 
to what extent the old elite was replaced; and whether there was a period of revolutionary or 
counter-revolutionary cooperation across ethnic boundaries (and if so, how long it lasted). 
Similarly under-researched topics include the installation of local governments in the new nation-
states; the nature and extent of local measures; personnel changes in local institutions, and the 
reconfiguration of politics, social roles, and public practices. Not even the top-down nationalizing 
efforts have been thoroughly surveyed at the local level. Indeed, most studies simply assume—on 
the basis of randomly selected examples and the not necessarily unbiased reports collected by 
state officials—that central orders and regulations were implemented “seamlessly.”4 
This chapter operates from the opposite assumption—that is, once the Habsburg Empire 
and its political institutions had collapsed, local elites and ordinary citizens, although their role in 
state affairs had grown markedly in the preceding decades,5 were confronted with daunting tasks 
that previously had been left to the state, and for which they had little, if any, experience.6 
Regardless of whether local leaders had been revolutionaries, they were forced to govern during 
this transitional period in unfamiliar roles and, largely, without effective support from central 
organs. Additionally, in the struggle to determine the territorial extent of the successor states, 
those people living in areas occupied and claimed by the new sovereigns had to face the 
emerging state and its homogenizing visions on their own. This led to the creation of what may 
be considered a new state space at the local level—one which directly affected the outcome of the 
state-building process itself, not least of all due to the limited capacity and efficiency of the new 
states but also, as we will see, the perseverance of local structures and institutions.7 
In this chapter, I address these issues through the state-building processes in regions that 
had belonged to Hungary and came under Czechoslovak and Romanian rule in 1919— Slovakia 
(or Upper Hungary, as it was called in the dualist era) and Transylvania, respectively. These were 
diverse, multi-ethnic areas with predominantly Hungarian and German urban populations despite 
an overall higher proportion of Slovaks and Romanians. While the majority of inhabitants spoke 
the language of their new rulers, the border zones contained Hungarian-speaking majorities even 
in the countryside. And some areas further from the new frontiers (the Saxon settlements in 
Southern Transylvania, the Banat, the Szeklerland, Maramureș, and the Spiš) were characterized 
by a strong Hungarian and German presence, often constituting the regional majority. 
Nor was diversity limited to language or nationality. Some of these areas were industrial 
zones (most notably the mining towns in the Banat or Jiu Valley) with large working-class 
populations. Others were home to sizable groups of religious minorities such as Jews and Greek 
Catholics in Northern Transylvania and Carpatho-Ukraine. These regions had distinct social, 
cultural, and administrative traditions as well.8 How they would confront state-building efforts 
based on different and even foreign practices remained to be seen. 
In order to highlight the important ways in which a local perspective can change our 
understanding of state formation, this chapter begins by discussing the different faces—social, 
national, and democratic—of the revolutions in 1918. It then examines the process of establishing 
a political administration, with an emphasis on the peculiar linguistic and symbolic features of the 
new local regimes and landscapes. The last part assesses how the different regions expressed 
themselves politically and socially in this early state-building period. 
 
The Three Faces of One Revolution 
The revolutions that took place in Eastern Europe between 1917 and 1919 strove to reconfigure 
politics, economics, and society such that more people would be enfranchised and national 
development would go hand-in-hand with greater economic equality. Of course, revolutionary 
elites were typically more interested in preserving their prerogatives than in acceding to the 
demands of ordinary people, who often made their own, local revolutions. But the leaders of the 
new nation-states promised to solve their problems together. 
Hungary was a prominent case with respect both to the national and social aspects of 
revolutionary state-building. When the Hungarian National Council, the interim legislative body 
of the country, declared independence from Austria-Hungary, it not only extended political rights 
through universal suffrage, but also created integrating institutions like workers’ and soldiers’ 
councils; promised minority rights and proper representation for nationalities; and offered to 
alleviate social ills by redistributing wealth (mainly through agrarian reform and the introduction 
of extensive social benefits). But these efforts confronted the similar goals of the Slovak, Czech, 
and Romanian National Councils, which sought to implement change on their own terms and in 
their own, respective national frameworks. From this perspective, then, national initiatives were 
crucial in the early phases of nation-state building in that they prevented cross-ethnic cooperation 
at the highest government levels. 
Rather than simply accepting historical Hungary’s existence and reform efforts, the Czech, 
Slovak, and Romanian National Councils envisioned their own independent nation-states. Thus, 
the national/political aspect of state-building overshadowed the social/economic one already by 
late October 1918. Unsurprisingly, differing political visions were the main sources for rivalry 
between revolutionary bodies, often disrupting interethnic cooperation among administrative 
elites. An oft-cited example is the negotiations between Oszkár Jászi, the Hungarian Minister for 
National Minorities, and representatives of the Romanian National Council at Arad. The stakes of 
these negotiations in late November 1918 were no less than the territorial consolidation of 
Hungary, as the Romanian National Council was demanding the immediate takeover of twenty-
three counties with Romanian populations (thereby extending its rule to the Eastern zone of the 
Great Plain and the whole of the Banat). Despite the wide-ranging concessions offered by Jászi, 
who proposed establishing a system of national cantons with broad autonomy, the Romanian 
politicians insisted upon having full sovereignty over all Romanian inhabited territories.9  
A similar scenario played out in Upper Hungary. On 6 December, Milan Hodža, a former 
member of the Hungarian Parliament and a representative of the Slovak National Council, came 
to terms with the Hungarian government over a demarcation line that left most of the contested 
territories with predominantly Hungarian populations under Hungarian control. However, he was 
soon denounced by the Czechoslovak government, which had been working with delegates to the 
Paris Peace Conference in order to establish a new border that put the disputed zone in its hands. 
As it happens, this border runs very close to the present one. 
At the local level, by contrast, cross-ethnic cooperation was more common, thus making it 
harder to distinguish the political and social aspects of the revolution. Moreover, local revolutions 
were often truly local in that they did not simply replicate what happened in the centers of 
national power. Instead, their main drivers were the social discontent of their respective 
populations, as well as the violence engendered by returning soldiers. Unsurprisingly, then, local 
leaders were often less concerned with national, state-building issues than material problems at 
home, which likewise meant that their construction of enemies did not straightforwardly fall 
along ethnic lines. 
Transylvania, a new province of Romania that was approximately thirty percent ethnic 
Hungarian and ten percent German, is a case in point. There, the local revolution and violence 
targeted everything associated with the old order. Not only did returning soldiers loot rampantly, 
but the local population took advantage of the breakdown in authority, which in any case was 
more often concerned with disarming the returning veterans than pursuing the local bands.10 
People in multi-ethnic regions often attacked state authorities regardless of their ethnicity, and 
looting was by no means confined to Hungarian property. The Romanian National party 
politician Ilie Lăzar learned this first-hand when, as a Honvéd (Hungarian military) officer, he 
travelled to Máramarossziget (Sighetu Marmației) in order to establish Romanian rule in the 
county. Instead, he was robbed clean by a band of returning Romanian soldiers who had come to 
“rescue” the Orthodox priest with whom Lăzar was lodging, and who were not deterred by the 
fact that the “Hungarian” officer also happened to be an ethnic Romanian.11 
Faced with such violence, state authorities often had to rely on National Councils to regain 
control. A circular from the Hungarian Interior Ministry admitted as much in December 1918: 
“During those unforgettable days, when the people’s will broke centuries of forced servitude, the 
National Councils provided an invaluable service for the true cause of liberty. […] Hungary’s 
liberated people owe their eternal gratitude to them.”12 The Councils had the capacity to run local 
administrations, organize armed national guards, and distribute provisions as part of their larger 
effort to reorganize society along national lines. But to what extent were local Councils the true 
embodiment of grassroots demands for a national order? At least three aspects of their activities 
indicate that the situation was more complex than the Councils typically presented it. 
First, many of these National Councils were organized following external initiatives, often 
by the delegates of county or even regional Councils.13 In these cases, the delegates brought with 
them a blueprint for action, describing whom to mobilize and how to legitimize the takeover. The 
scripted nature of these events in many localities suggests that the vision of a spontaneous 
revolution generating new institutions along national lines found much less support at the local 
level than it did among urban intellectuals and political elites. Moreover, the sequence of events 
was surprisingly similar in such disparate regions as the Barcaság (Burzenland, Țară Bârsei) 
around Brassó (Kronstadt, Brașov); the Nagy-Küküllő (Târnava Mare) river zone; and 
Szászrégen (Sächisch Reen, Reghin), especially north and south. First, the Councils established 
in the major regional cities (Brassó, Nagyszeben [Hermannstadt, Sibiu], and Szászrégen) all 
declared some form of national autonomy. A few days or weeks later, after securing the 
cooperation of county administrators, they sent representatives to villages in which the National 
Council had less presence. These representatives sought out influential local figures; instructed 
them on how to set up their own councils; and participated in the festivities for newly elected 
officials tasked with “initiating” the council. Control over the local councils could be quite strict 
as well. A memorandum adopted by the inaugural session of the Maroslaka (Huduc, today 
Maiorești) Romanian National Council, for example, contained a verbatim paragraph on the 
rejection of false compromises from a memo issued by the Reghin National Council.14 
Secondly, most of the National Councils prioritized material issues over national ones. 
Some were eager to reopen old conflicts over property rights irrespective of their opponents’ 
nationality. The Romanian communities in the Görgény Valley (Ghurghiul) offer a telling 
example. In the village of Görgényhodák (Hodac), the first session of the Romanian National 
Council adopted a resolution demanding that the Great Council (sfatul cel mare), which would 
discuss the rightful demands of oppressed nations, include the village’s claim to the surrounding 
forests they had lost in 1848.15 In the nearby village of Görgényorsova (Orșova), the National 
Council met on 1 December 1918, the same day as the Great Assembly of Alba Iulia, which 
declared the union of Transylvania with Romania. The participants decided to increase defense of 
the community forests and to send delegates to neighboring villages to warn them not to enter 
without permission.16 The deliberate timing of the Görgényorsova “Great National Assembly” 
illustrates the extent to which locals went to manipulate national politics for their material aims, 
in this case drawing upon the legitimacy conferred by events in Alba Iulia. 
Finally, despite numerous references to “the nation” in histories of this transformational 
period, there is evidence to suggest that, at least during the initial phase of the revolution, the 
concept of Romanian nationhood was less clear-cut than contemporaries claimed and historians 
and politicians have largely accepted since.17 Indeed, Romanian exertions in favor of self-
determination appear ambiguous if we examine some National Councils’ declarations in the 
immediate aftermath of the regime change. On 10 November in Erdőidecs (Idicel Pădure), for 
example, the Council referred to Romanian self-determination from Hungary and Transylvania, 
without mentioning union with the Old Kingdom of Romania. Yet more astoundingly, on 8 
November 1918 the National Council from Görgénynádas (Nădașa Româna) announced and 
greeted the formation of the Hungarian National Council in Budapest, as well as the nomination 
of Mihály Károlyi as Prime Minister. It then declared its adherence to the program of the 
Budapest Hungarian National Council. Another passage from this declaration asserted that the 
Romanians had gained their right for self-government “in this country” [i.e., Hungary], which 
would be realized through the Romanian National Council in Arad.18 This Council thus viewed 
its legitimacy as derived from the Hungarian national revolution rather than the Romanian one. 
These organizational and ideological aspects of the local National Councils can also be 
found on the territory of present-day Slovakia, where the revolution unfolded in similar ways at 
the local level in terms of the collapse of administrations, the influence of National Councils, and 
the predominance of material issues over national ones.19 In the case of Nyitra (Nitra), the seat of 
a Catholic bishopric, the National Council was initially formed by representatives of the Social 
Democrats, the Christian Socialists, and the Hungarian opposition parties. They were soon joined 
by ethnic Slovaks from the ranks of the Catholic clergy (like Josef Tiso) and the Christian 
Socialist association, though many, including Tiso, initially referred to themselves as Hungarians. 
With the advent of political events in Prague and Budapest, however, more ethnically narrow 
National Councils were formed.20 
In the Slovakian capital Pozsony (Pressburg, Bratislava), studied by Pieter van Duin, 
organized labor also became a factor in the local administration, in sharp contrast to its minimal 
role in mainly agrarian Transylvania.21 The Social Democrats in particular—including Germans, 
Hungarians, and Slovaks—dominated the transitional period in Pozsony, acting as a stabilizing 
force through their exceptional organization and connections to Budapest and, to a lesser extent, 
Vienna. Although not necessarily indifferent to nationality, the Social Democrats’ admirable 
ethnic tolerance lasted through the mid-1920s, when the new Czechoslovak state began 
undermining their position with nationalizing policies that favored Czechs and Slovaks even 
among the ranks of organized labor. These policies eventually led to the dissolution of the 
Hungarian-German Social Democratic Party. Romanian regions with similar social fabrics, such 
as mining districts and industrial Temesvár (Temeschwar, Timișoara), underwent comparable 
transitions: initially, organized workers and their parties fended off nationalizing efforts, only to 
be pushed aside by the state administrations appointed by the military authorities in early January 
1919.22 
These relatively exceptional cases of industrial areas raise the broader question of 
interethnic cooperation. The very purpose of National Councils was to dissociate national 
communities, despite the fact that local, everyday social and political life was well-entwined 
nationally. For this reason, local level cooperation among National Councils tended to be the 
norm. Common bodies were established to oversee food and firewood provisions, collect local 
taxes and fees, and to distribute the confiscated property. Different national guards coordinated 
security measures and patrols.23 And at least in one case, in Nagymoha (Grănări, Mukendorf), the 
Hungarian National Council refused to begin operations until its Romanian counterpart was 
established and they could run the locality together.24 
In county seats, most National Councils initially operated in an ethnically mixed manner.25 
Josef Tiso was not the only politician who came to prominence as the leader of a nation-state 
(i.e., the Slovak Republic formed under the tutelage of Nazi Germany), but started his political 
career in a National Council that sustained peaceful, interethnic cooperation.26 The Romanian 
National Council in Deva was headed by the future Romanian Prime Minister Petru Groza, who 
despite the intransigent position of the general Romanian National Council concerning 
sovereignty over eastern Hungary and Transylvania, waited until early December 1918 to order 
the removal of ethnic Romanians from the local Hungarian National Council.27 
In addition to these individual cases, the overall composition of the National Councils had a 
lasting political impact in the interwar period. The first few weeks featured (partial) elite 
replacement in which centrally appointed officials often departed, while representatives from the 
hitherto dominant Hungarian political parties were sidelined (especially István Tisza’s Party of 
National Labor). Those acceding to power through the National Councils either represented the 
parliamentary opposition or parties that still lacked institutional influence, such as the Social 
Democrats and Bourgeois Radicals. These parties formed a new ruling class even when the 
representatives of the traditional opposition, such as the Catholic People’s Party in Upper 
Hungary, already had a strong presence in local communities. The National Councils thus served 
as nodes in a newly emerging social network, enabling hitherto peripheral groups and 
personalities to access power at the local, regional and, often, national levels.28 
Groza, who maintained ties with the Hungarian elite throughout his life, is a good example 
of this. Although many of his contacts stemmed from his privileged high school years in 
Szászváros (Broos, Oraștie), Groza nurtured these relationships to the extent that he even 
participated in a class reunion in Budapest during his tenure as President of (socialist) Romania in 
the 1950s. But in the 1920s, Groza was a regional leader of General Alexandru Averescu’s 
People’s Party, in which capacity he served as an interlocutor between the Hungarian minority 
party and Averescu, with whom the Hungarians concluded an agreement on electoral and 
political cooperation in 1923.29 Jozef Tiso also profited from his membership in the Nitra (Nyitra) 
National Council through his contact with fellow member Jenő Lelley, who went on to become 
chairman of the Christian Socialist Party in Slovakia. This supposedly trans-ethnic organization 
was on Budapest’s payroll and often toyed with Hungarian revisionism. Nevertheless, after 
Lelley was ousted as party chairman in 1925, he founded another party (the Christian Socialist 
Party of Western Slovakia) with a pro-Czechoslovak platform, an apparent volte-face only until 
one considers the personal connections Lelley established during the revolutionary period, and 
the overtures made around 1925 towards reconciling the Slovak People’s Party and the 
Czechoslovak government. The party, which Tiso also helped to found, eventually entered the 
government and became part of the ruling coalition from 1927 to 1929. 
The revolutionary period was short and transitory. Overlooking it, however, would be to 
lose sight of the extent to which state rule had collapsed. During these first few weeks, the 
“national interest” and the common weal of the nation were defined differently in different places 
(at least at the local level), and they often deviated from the ideals and interests advocated by the 
central National Councils.30 It was only the presence of the conquering states’ representatives that 
ended this practice, which could not have happened without first eliminating the Councils 
themselves. 
 
Administering the Bitter Pills 
Extending state power to the newly acquired regions was complicated by the fact that the new 
states were often a patchwork of legal systems and administrative cultures. Greater Romania 
inherited provinces from Cisleithania, Russia, and Hungary, while Czechoslovakia tried to 
combine Hungarian, Austrian, and provincial legal systems. The transition to a new, unified legal 
framework supervised by a new administration was thus bound to be a protracted one. Indeed, 
some important pieces of legislation were never entirely replaced.31 
The idiosyncrasies of provincial legal traditions required first-hand knowledge, which made 
employing transferred or newly recruited personnel more problematic. The takeover of the 
administration and public services typically lasted for months, while new administrative laws 
were not passed until the mid-1920s. Moreover, despite similarities in the takeover processes, the 
outcomes in Czechoslovakia and Romania differed significantly in terms of minority 
participation in the administration and the continuity of pre-1918 personnel. 
Initially, the goal was similar in both countries: secure an oath of loyalty from officials in 
the existing institutions, if necessary by threat of dismissal. The responses, however, differed 
considerably. In the territories under Czechoslovak rule, officials only pledged their loyalty after 
receiving permission to do so from Budapest, whereas in Transylvania they were instructed by 
Budapest authorities to reject the oath.32 Many officials actually fled to Budapest, causing serious 
political and social problems, though a large number of public servants remained at their posts.33 
Ultimately, the fate of those who stayed was not decided by the formal oath, but rather by the 
human resources available to the new states. 
In Transylvania, taking the oath did not necessarily determine whether one kept one’s job. 
As a general rule, high-ranking officials who refused the oath did so as a political gesture, while 
those serving in less important and publicly exposed positions could more easily take it without 
fear of repercussions should Hungarian rule be restored or they decide to emigrate.34 But even 
those who rejected the oath were not automatically removed from service. While the new rulers 
certainly preferred qualified Romanian applicants, in places like Târnaveni (Dicsőszentmárton) 
the new prefect was forced to work with an administrative team that had declared its loyalty to 
the Romanian National Council despite not speaking Romanian.35 Even when the administration 
was totally replaced, as in the county of Solnoc-Dobăca (Szolnok-Doboka), appointments for 
low-level positions were not necessarily ethnically biased simply due to the shortage of suitable 
Romanian applicants.36 Consequently, the ratio of minority public servants roughly corresponded 
with the proportion of minorities in Transylvania’s population well into the mid–1930s. In many 
counties, there was much continuity between pre-1918 and post-1918 personnel. For example, in 
Caraș-Severin (Krassó-Szörény), more than sixty percent of the minority village notaries in 1934 
started their careers before 1919. In Trei Scaune (Háromszék) county, two-thirds of village 
notaries in 1921 held a similar post before 1919, and more than half of those were in the same 
position before the world war. Among officials of the central county organs, only one-third 
belonged to this more experienced group, but fifty-nine percent of the newly hired officials were 
Hungarians.37 
Administrative institutions were not the only ones faced with a shortage of qualified 
employees—some public services were simply too essential to function with inexperienced staff. 
Postal workers thus kept their jobs in Romania regardless of ethnicity and despite nationally 
motivated attacks.38 This emphasis on expertise is perhaps best exemplified by the management 
of postal services by ethnic Hungarians in some remote, predominantly Romanian areas through 
the first years of the Antonescu era (1940–1944)!39 Successful outcomes often superseded ethnic 
prejudices to such an extent that local authorities would assign politically charged tasks to 
minority officials. For example, the chief magistrate of the Oradea county court assigned a 
Hungarian examining magistrate to investigate the murder of two Romanian intellectuals by 
Hungarian troops in Beiuș (Belényes) in April 1919. Fearing a biased investigation, the 
opposition attacked the government in parliament for this specific assignment. Yet the court 
upheld it on the grounds that this dutiful Hungarian magistrate was the only one who had ample 
time for such a case.40 Defending state authority against perceived threats or even illegalities 
sometimes required the removal of self-appointed Romanian officials. In the county of Cluj 
(Kolozs), some Hungarian village notaries who had been expelled during the revolution and 
replaced by local Romanian notables (like a Greek Catholic priest), were later reinstated by the 
new Romanian administration.41 
The process unfolded differently in Czechoslovakia, where Hungarian officials retained 
their posts until enough qualified Czech and Slovak bureaucrats could take over the 
administration and public services. As a result, layoffs took place gradually depending upon local 
circumstances and external political events. In Bratislava (Pressburg, Pozsony), for example, the 
administration was re-staffed so cautiously that, in the early 1920s, most local officials still came 
from the pre-1918 period.42 Eventually, however, the administration was filled with a new 
generation of Czech and Slovak officials and the ratio of Hungarian public servants halved 
between 1921 and 1930, while mainly pre-1918 public servants of Slovak nationality were 
retained.43 But these so-called magyaróns (pro-Hungarians) had to demonstrate their new 
national loyalty by adhering to Slovak (or Czechoslovak) customs and social practices, thereby 
abandoning their earlier means of displaying middle-class status.44 
Hungarian postal and railway workers faced a harsher fate in Czechoslovakia than in 
Romania when they refused to take the loyalty oath and/or engaged in strike activity. The latter 
was quite common due to the strength of organized labor and Social Democracy in these 
territories of the emerging Czechoslovak Republic. After the creation of the Hungarian Soviet 
Republic in March 1919, moreover, unionized minority workers became increasingly suspect as 
supporters of a Bolshevik Revolution. This suspicion accelerated their removal from service.45  
Local power relations played out differently in Romania and Czechoslovakia. 
Czechoslovak laws entitled communities to effective self-government based upon proportional 
representation in local political bodies like city councils and county assemblies (and, after 1927, 
regional assemblies as well). In localities where minority parties had sufficient support, they 
could meaningfully influence decisions concerning schools, cultural and social institutions, and 
even street names.46 In Romania, by contrast, such elected local bodies served only between 1926 
and 1933 (and not without interruptions), and decisions about these issues were made by a 
centrally appointed commission composed of politicians close to the government. In this way, 
minority elites in these localities lacked a means for formal influence on local issues, though they 
often managed to have a voice through personal and professional connections or political pacts 
between parties.47 Romanian political forces competing for power often sought support from 
minorities by forging such informal compromises. For example, in major Saxon towns the 
mayors were still Saxons until the 1930s. And in most Szekler cities, local Hungarian political 
groups, sometimes in rivalry with each other, gained official positions by the mid-1920s. Every 
Romanian party had its own Hungarian members and candidates in the most important 
localities.48 It was thus not only the absence of democratic elections that made such informal 
political settlements easier in Romania, but also the fact that minorities had a strong presence at 
the mid and low levels of county administration, creating an environment that directly fostered 
cooperation between politicians.49 
Yet another example of the continuity of state institutions and the survival of social 
practices is the voluntary firefighter associations in Transylvania. Such organizations were 
nonexistent in the Old Kingdom of Romania, where firefighters were subordinated to the 
military. In Transylvanian cities like Caransebeș (Karansschebes, Karánsebes) and Brașov, by 
contrast, these associations flourished, assembling public officials and the middle- and lower 
middle-classes regardless of nationality. Their working language was either Hungarian or 
German, and it often remained so despite frequent attacks on the associations during the interwar 
period. When the Romanian General Staff banned them in the province for their alleged 
irredentism (the circular order claimed that these associations had only been recently founded by 
Hungarian irredentists), county and local administrators protested and the mayor of Caransebeș 
sent an emotional, eight-page letter to his superiors denying the presence of irredentist 
Hungarians and the use of Hungarian language, and defending the firefighter associations as 
wellsprings of patriotism and altruism:  
We solemnly reject the accusations; those brave people do not deserve the label of 
irredentist Hungarians. […] The Romanians were never excluded from the ranks 
of the firefighters, [and] even now 10 out of 25 are Romanians, all of them having 
served 20–30 years. By no means was the association founded by well-known 
Hungarian irredentists. Nor could it serve Hungarian propaganda and the 
preservation of the Hungarian spirit, as the firefighters started to work fifty years 
ago, when not a single Hungarian word was heard in the city. The Germans who 
founded the association developed it in cooperation with Romanians. […] The 
prefect certainly knows that every loyal son of the country ought to have a place 
among the voluntary firefighters, irrespective of his mother tongue.50 
The mayor’s argument reveals more than just indignation over the negligence of local 
traditions—it shows how the nationalizing rhetoric from below was used to fend off nationalizing 
policies from above. The mayor was probably telling an “official” truth, though police reports 
confirm that Hungarians belonged to the associations and that their language was one of the 
firefighters’ working languages.51 
 
Lands of Promise 
Historians have analyzed a broad range of symbolic nationalizing efforts in terms of how they 
transformed cities or forced traditional public practices into the private sphere following regime 
change. Rituals and festive days from the dualist era that came to be regarded as expressions of 
Hungarian nationality, for example, were replaced by new festivities and personality cults. 
Likewise, monuments were destroyed, removed or relocated; and Hungarian national days were 
celebrated in private or semi-public spheres such as churches.52 Yet these efforts to undermine 
national symbols and practices often had the opposite effect—renewing national consciousness 
even among social groups that had been indifferent towards Hungarian rituals. Thus, for example, 
on 20 August 1920, social democratically inclined Hungarian workers in Brașov, who formerly 
had refrained from demonstrations of religious adherence, attended the feast of Saint Stephen and 
effusively sang the Hungarian national anthem with the Roman Catholic congregation.53 
Moreover, the new cults and rituals often possessed their own attractions irrespective of 
national identity. In Czechoslovakia, large segments of the Hungarian and German populations 
took part in the Masaryk cult, sometimes to the extent of venerating the president as a benevolent 
figure whose gestures towards minorities promised to resolve their problems.54 Local activist 
(i.e., pro-Czechoslovak) parties were often able to capitalize on Masaryk’s personality cult when 
competing with minority Hungarian parties.55 After all, this quasi-religious loyalty to the Czech 
president had direct links to the dualist era in that it constructed Masaryk as the heir to the 
venerable Habsburg Emperor Franz Joseph. Similarly, in Romania allegiance to the ruler (the 
king of Hungary) was easily transferred to the king of Romania, even by his minority subjects. 
Numerous royal petitions from mainly lower class Hungarians reached the royal court just as they 
had in dualist Hungary. Betti Juhász from Petroșani (Petrozsény), for example, asked the King for 
a dowry, while the Cluj (Kolozsvár) locksmith István Kun just asked for permission to baptize his 
son after His Majesty’s Christian name. In the case of these petitions, socio-economic status was 
more decisive than nationality or local context.56 
Social networks often transcended ethno-national boundaries when it came to resisting 
central nationalizing initiatives. The importance of these networks is well illustrated by local 
national markers like street names, statuary, and middle-class cultural activities. Street names in 
particular constituted crucial indicators of ethnic ownership and a symbolic means of occupation. 
Hungarian cities had been increasingly nationalized through street renaming before 1914, and the 
new regimes continued the practice.57 However, the different patterns of street renaming 
throughout Romania and Czechoslovakia suggest that these nationalizing initiatives could easily 
be sidetracked. 
This was widely visible in Czechoslovak towns and cities, where effective local self-
government enabled the representatives of minority Hungarian and/or German communities to 
determine geographic names and nomenclature (if not in Hungarian or German, then often 
bilingually). As long as a specified percentage of registered minorities lived in any one locality, it 
was minimally required to have bilingual street signs. With enough votes in the local council, the 
minority elite could even choose the street names provided they did not explicitly challenge 
Czechoslovak symbolism.58 The exceptions were larger, more important cities in which political 
exigencies and central initiatives prevailed over minority rights. Bratislava was the most flagrant 
example, as not only was the city re-christened with its largely invented Slovak name, but the 
official renaming was held just before the 15 March Remembrance Day for the 1848 Hungarian 
Revolution. Throughout the interwar years, such symbolic conquests gradually erased Hungarian 
national figures from the city’s map, eventually even eliminating the neutral ones.59 
Similarly, in the Transylvanian capital Cluj the new prefect provocatively issued his first 
decree on renaming twenty streets on 15 March 1919. A year later, not one Hungarian street 
name had been left untouched. These changes were more abrupt and arbitrary than in 
Czechoslovakia, since local self-government was not practiced in the region until the late 1920s. 
Interestingly, however, the new nomenclature was neither original nor did it represent a major 
municipal reinvention. On the contrary, it was the mirror image of a symbolic map in which 
Hungarian historical figures were replaced by their closest Romanian counterparts from the same 
period: Romanian military units for Hungarian military units (Dorobanților for Honvéd); heroes 
of anti-Ottoman wars for anti-Ottoman warriors (Ștefan cel Mare for János Hunyadi); famous 
writers for famous writers (Imre Madách for Ion Heliade Rădulescu); and revolutionaries for 
revolutionaries from roughly the same era (Sándor Petőfi for Avram Iancu).60 
The limited Romanian presence in pre-1918 Cluj (according to the 1910 census, just twelve 
percent of the population was ethnic Romanian) made it difficult to impose a preexisting, though 
unofficial Romanian symbolic geography on its streets, as occurred, for example, in the 
Romanian city of Făgăraș (Fogaras, Fogarasch). Apart from the main roads and squares, it was 
unclear which areas had the most political and/or cultural relevance for the Romanian 
community. Consequently, it was hard to determine the most appropriate street names, in which 
case the new rulers simply adopted what they had inherited. Cluj’s obvious political importance, 
for example, did not permit a more partial renaming as occurred in Oradea (Nagyvárad), where 
fewer street names were changed and the whole process proceeded rather unsystematically. 
Indeed, in Oradea several street names considered Hungarian (Ferenc Deák, Kálvin, Saint 
Ladislaus) continued to be used officially.61 
Another important variable in renaming patterns was adherence to or deviation from a 
generalized national pantheon. The former was advocated (or even instructed) from Bucharest 
and is well-illustrated by the city of Lugoj (Lugos, Lugosch), the seat of a Greek-Catholic 
diocese. The latter, which usually implied recourse to more regional symbols, was evident in 
Făgăraș and Caransebeș. While all three cities were home to a significant Romanian middle-class, 
the situation in Lugoj suggests that the presence of competing non-Romanian elites (Serbs, in this 
case) could adversely affect the behavior of local Romanians. Moreover, when the French had 
controlled Lugoj in the summer of 1919, they restored the Hungarian administration. Thus, local 
Romanians faced with such political uncertainty were more likely to adhere to Bucharest’s 
nationalizing expectations than they were in other parts of the Banat.62 
Statues and other monuments/memorials underwent a parallel fate to street names, 
especially in regional capitals where the new rulers acted promptly to reconfigure symbolic 
space. Again, in Czechoslovakia there were usually still opportunities for minorities to celebrate 
anti-Habsburg revolutionary traditions in line with the Republic’s progressive, anti-Habsburg 
founding myth. In this way, statues of Hungarian heroes like Petőfi (the poet-hero of 1848) were 
sometimes tolerated. In 1923, the centenary of his birth was even commemorated in Bratislava.63 
Nevertheless, nationalizing pressures were stronger for monuments than they were for street 
names, and often despite local efforts to preserve elements of the pre-1918 symbolic space. The 
destruction of the Maria Theresia statue in central Bratislava during the night of 26 October 1921, 
for example, was a premeditated political act parallel to the city government’s resolve to erect a 
monument to Milan Rastislav Štefánik, the Slovak pilot-hero who died mysteriously in a plane 
crash in 1919.64 The new governments also took advantage of their growing differences with 
previously acculturated or Magyarized nationalities to weaken Hungarians by making symbolic 
concessions to non-Magyar organizations. Even the German-speaking and pro-Hungarian Zipsers 
from Slovakia established a symbolic topography in 1919, which, they boasted to Budapest, 
preserved the Hungarian character of the region through the revival of local traditions and the 
commemoration of local figures and events.65 
In Romania, conditions on the ground also determined the authorities’ attitudes towards 
statuary. In Oradea, at least six pre-war public memorials survived until 1934.66 In several 
smaller cities, authorities tolerated statues of Hungarian national figures with local connections, 
and even some heroes’ memorials for the First World War. One of these war memorials depicted 
a Turul bird, the mythic forefather of Hungarians and a controversial national symbol.67 More 
intriguing yet was a professional survey and preservation project of existing statues/memorials 
undertaken by the new Romanian authorities in the Banat. Although it only lasted until the mid-
1920s, it signified a more relaxed official attitude toward these monuments in a region where 
traditionally strong dynastic loyalty had already produced protests against the removal of Franz 
Joseph’s statue from Caransebeș (1919).68 This emotional attachment to Habsburg symbols—
viewed even by Romanians as an important component of local identity—exemplifies the 
commonalities of social life across ethnic boundaries. As with the aforementioned voluntary 
firefighter’s associations, specific institutions or practices that were common to Transylvanian 
Romanians, Germans, and Hungarians could well have been alien to Old Kingdom Romanians. 
For middle-class Transylvanians, cultural practices met with particular disapproval from 
authorities due largely to their alleged non-Romanian character. Gypsy music, suspicious coffee 
house gatherings, and Habsburg military songs could be censured as much as speaking Hungarian 
in public or, certainly, singing the Hungarian national anthem could. Two incidents from around 
1930 glaringly illustrate this attachment to old customs. In Brașov, the military band of an elite 
mountain unit of the Romanian army played the Hungarian song “32-es baka vagyok én” (I’m a 
private from the 32nd regiment) to the widespread applause of a multi-ethnic (German, 
Hungarian, and Romanian) audience. And in Târgu Secuiesc (Kézdivásárhely), the Romanian 
director of the state lyceum slapped the leader of a gypsy band when he refused to play the 
Hungarian national anthem. Public officials treated both incidents as signs of Hungarian 
irredentism. Yet local Romanians used them to express something that was otherwise hard to 
integrate into the official concept of Romanian national identity.69 Furthermore, these shared 
cultural practices reinforced networks and patronage systems that transcended ethnic boundaries 
and were beneficial in the informal world of local Transylvanian politics. 
Some of these practices were also prevalent in Slovakia, but rarely as part of the cultural 
repertoire of ethnically mixed, socially homogeneous groups. If one exempts the demand for 
gypsy music (particularly from middle-class Hungarians),70 then most multicultural social 
interactions were either isolated acts of defiance from Slovak politicians (a remnant of their 
socialization in pre-war Hungary) or a hidden practice with an ethnic and moral stigma attached. 
Ferdinand (Ferdiš) Juriga, a Catholic priest and Slovak People’s Party politician who served in a 
village near Budapest for many years before the war, often made gypsy bands play the Hungarian 
national anthem.71 Despite such public demonstrations of otherness, the main social group 
preserving important elements of its dualist era socialization, the so-called magyaróns, were 
depicted by contemporary social researchers as being afraid to display their “Hungarian” cultural 
practices. Although they still listened to Budapest radio, read Hungarian books and newspapers, 
and sang Hungarian songs in Bratislava pubs while drinking the “heuriger” (seasonal wine), 
magyaróns often feared the repercussions—including conflict with Slovak nationalists, fights 
with students or, in the worst case, removal from office—if they did so too visibly.72 
Paradoxically, public displays of “Hungarian-ness” were more frequently used to distance 
oneself from the current Hungarian regime. An alternative, lower middle- and working- class 
cultural scene developed, often with state assistance and the participation of avant-garde 
progressivist figures (sometimes from Hungary proper, like Lajos Kassák). This culture was 
tightly bound to a republican and pro-Czechoslovak Hungarian political current that was 
extremely critical of Admiral Horthy’s Hungary. It thus constituted an alternative national culture 
from the dominant cultural expressions in mainstream minority Hungarian organizations, and was 
barely tolerated in Horthy-era Hungary.73 
In Slovakia, the most striking feature of pre-war cultural traditions was thus not their 
survival, but the gaping hole their absence could leave in the community. This is probably why so 
many Hungarians misinterpreted their experiences abroad, especially the enthusiastic receptions 
they often received. When Géza Lakatos, the Hungarian military attaché in Prague and future 
Prime Minister of Hungary, accompanied President Masaryk to a military exercise in Central 
Slovakia, he recalled his kingly treatment by waiters, drivers and hotel boys, who competed to 
oblige him.74 Lakatos saw this as an indication of their sincere desire to be reunited with 
Hungary. However, it may also have suggested nostalgia for the lavish feasts and drinking bouts, 
not to mention the generous tips that a Hungarian uniform inspired. Meanwhile, Slovaks 
perceived Czechs as the bearers of a less noble culture, which sidelined such pleasurable 
pastimes.75 This interpretation is supported by many contemporary accounts attesting to the lower 
social distinction of Czechoslovak officers when compared to k.u.k. or Honvéd officers.76 For 
instance, the Czechs often flouted parts of the unwritten, pre-1918 code of conduct by refusing to 
duel when they were insulted.77 
On the other hand, some minority Hungarian observers in the 1930s contrasted the 
democratic petty bourgeois habits and values of the Czech middle class with the “feudal” 
Hungarian world of the Habsburg past. The transformation of popular culture and social practices 
corroborated this. While in Romania gypsy bands remained popular and played Hungarian music 
during the interwar years, in Czechoslovakia this traditional music was gradually replaced by 
jazz.78 Alongside the restaurants and coffeehouses where the Hungarian middle-classes often met, 
new canteens now served food in large quantities and counter service replaced table service, 
propelling the disappearance of “Stammtisch” (regulars’ table) culture and entertainment.79 New 
social hierarchies and a strong lower-class institutionalized culture—especially in contrast with 
Romania’s oligarchic political structure and predominantly rural population—did more to 
transform urban spaces than did forced nationalization. 
 
Ghosts From a Recent Past? 
Some of the phenomena outlined above point to non-national allegiances and identifications at 
the regional level. For instance, institutions unfamiliar to the new rulers and social practices that 
varied between Romanians and Transylvanians (or Czech[oslovak]s and Slovaks) were often part 
of a broader pattern of socio-cultural specificities that distinguished the center from the province. 
A discourse that reflected this distinctiveness thus emerged not only in the case of Slovak or 
Transylvanian Romanian identities (politically represented by strong regionalist parties as they 
were), but also around more local affinities.80 The best examples are the small, short-lived 
republics that emerged during the revolutions. Often regarded by scholars as mere subterfuges to 
avert incorporation into the new states while still seemingly severing ties with Hungary, they had 
solid foundations among the local population, most notably in the Banat, in Eastern Slovakia, and 
in Kalotaszeg (Țară Călației), near Cluj (Kolozsvár). In these regions of Greater Romania, social 
affiliations and economic imperatives trumped national ones such that organized labor (Banat) 
and a rural cooperative movement (Kalotaszeg) produced experiments in self-rule. These 
movements were not completely devoid of national content and many, in fact, were undertaken 
by Hungarian and German officials. But they all displayed a distinctly regional attachment—a 
Kalotaszeg identity as opposed to the Hungarian-ness promoted by prewar Budapest—evident in 
the political discourse of these localized socio-economic movements.81 
In Eastern Slovakia, patterns of regional consciousness promoted by the Hungarian elite 
before 1918, had aimed to preserve a distinct form of patriotic Slavic attachment to the idea of 
Hungary, rather than promoting complete assimilation. The changes wrought by the First World 
War gave new impetus to these efforts, and Slovaks were yet more positively portrayed in the 
Hungarian public sphere.82 The Eastern Slovak National Council, led by Viktor Dvorčak 
(Dvorcsák Győző), embodied this political current in its defiance of the Slovak National Council 
in Turčiansky Svätý Martin (Túrócszentmárton). Although Dvorčak and his companions 
emigrated (and as émigrés, they collaborated with the Hungarian government and its agents), a 
group of Slovak intellectuals from the area worked with the local middle classes to preserve this 
identity after 1919.83 
The two most striking examples of local identification were in the Transylvanian regions 
west of the Țară Moților (Motzenland, Mócvidék) and in the small District of Chioar (Kővár-
vidék). Both had long traditions of separate administration, distinct local societies and, in the case 
of the former, lay partially outside the principality of Transylvania before it merged with 
Hungary in 1867. The Țară Moților region, moreover, was comprised mainly of small mining 
towns where local businesses had not yet been taken over by large companies. The town of Beiuș 
and its surroundings had thus served as a kind of “ethnic contact zone” in which cross-ethnic 
middle-class practices played an important role in daily life.84 The District of Chioar was 
populated by Hungarians and Greek Catholic Romanians with noble status or special liberties that 
elevated them above serfs in the pre-1848 feudal system. Marketplaces rather than modern urban 
facilities served as its administrative and economic centers. Visitors often described the regions 
as non-Romanian and its inhabitants as alien or people of degenerate “Romanian-ness.” The 
locals, in turn, sometimes violently attacked these “intruders” with the help of the local 
Romanian police or gendarmerie, who slandered the newcomers in Hungarian.85 
These distinctions explain the reaction of local elites to plans to redraw administrative 
boundaries in 1919. Although their original administrative units had been abolished almost fifty 
years earlier, representatives of both regions asked for their reinstatement when the Ruling 
Council sought proposals for a new administrative territorial system in order to provide better 
access to public services. Despite using the well-known nationalist arguments to defend their 
claims (insisting that the redistricting would favor Romanians and disadvantage Hungarians), 
what they really wanted was to return to a past in which their social and legal status, and the 
specific rights and privileges associated with it, defined them more than their nationality did. 
 Conclusion 
My aim in this chapter has been to outline aspects of the transition from Austria-Hungary to 
Czechoslovakia and Romania that shed light on continuities and discontinuities in the 
establishment of nation-states. As we have seen, most of these elements—the role of civic 
associations, middle-class culture, administrative personnel and their practices, regionalist 
politics—were rooted in the local societies of the contested territories, such that it was hardly 
possible to integrate them into the homogenizing, unitary framework of the nationalizing 
successor states. Indeed, the national governments left little room for compromise in their unitary 
and national visions for Czechoslovakia and Romania. Yet a combination of limited resources, 
executive constraints, and above all the persistence of local political and social structures often 
produced exceptions that challenged or even violated the nationalizing regulations. 
The above examples are, of course, far from exhaustive, and thus cannot adequately answer 
such broad questions as how, why, and to what extent these compromises emerged and persisted. 
But the sheer variety of social practices, institutions, and other local factors points to the potential 
for further comprehensive research into the clearly crucial role played by local societies in the 
transition from empire to nation-state. Moreover, such local-level comparative research sheds 
light not only on the differences and similarities between state-building outcomes, but also on 
how varying conditions developed within the successor states. 
Finally, by discerning patterns of transition in terms of the functioning of different local 
societies, we gain insight into how nationalizing, postwar successor states were established and 
managed in the interwar period. Although it is hard to believe that any of the phenomena 
mentioned above could have derailed the fast-moving train of nationalization, the findings of this 
study show that, for a significant period, local elites, newly emerged social groups, and their oft 
reorganized institutions were strong enough to achieve concessions and compromises. This paints 
quite a different picture of interwar Czechoslovakia and Romania from that of national 
government centered studies: a patchwork of local transitions as opposed to a top-down 
implementation of state-building measures. 
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